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Editor’s Note
We are very pleased to present Volume 2: Issue 1 of the SCR 2019. We have selected four
cases for review. In this issue we feature two important regional cases, one decided by the
nascent Zimbabwean Constitutional Court and the other, by the Kenyan Supreme Court. The
other two cases are drawn from within Zambia and determined by the Constitutional Court and
the Supreme Court respectively.
The first case comment analyses the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court’s decision in the case
of Nelson Chamisa v Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa dealing with the disputed presidential
election of August 2018 in Zimbabwe. The significance of the decision is self-evident as this
was the first post-Mugabe election which in a sense tested the democratic credentials of postMugabe institutions, including the judiciary. The second case commentary turns our attention
to Kenya, to the cases of Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission and Others (2013 and 2017). The commentary has a narrow but
significant focus on the proper import of invalid votes in the democratic process.
Coming back to Zambia, we look at two cases, one decided by the Constitutional Court and
having stirred a major national debate, and the other, which went largely unnoticed, yet is very
significant in the evolution of Zambian jurisprudence on customary law. The case of Daniel
Pule and Others v Attorney General dealt with the eligibility of President Lungu to stand for
another term in office, having already served two terms in office. The final case is that of Kilolo
Ng’ambi v Opa Kapijimpanga, which required the Supreme Court to determine how succession
to traditional chieftaincy office should be determined where there were competing candidates
and existing customary law was limited and unable to help resolve the competing claims.
The selection of our four case notes, featuring two important African regional decisions and
two cases from Zambia’s twin apex courts, promise to provide insights, intrigue and perhaps
despondency about the development of contextually relevant jurisprudence by our courts.
Tinenenji Banda

O’Brien Kaaba
Nelson Chamisa v Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa and Others CCZ 42/18 (August
2018)
O’Brien Kaaba
Facts
Zimbabwe held its first post-Mugabe general elections on 30th July 2018. On 3rd August 2018,
the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as
the candidate who received the requisite ‘more than half the number of votes cast’ and declared
duly elected President of Zimbabwe. Aggrieved by this development, Nelson Chamisa, the
main opposition contender, challenged the validity of the election of Mnangagwa in the
Constitutional Court.
Holding
After hearing the case, the Constitutional Court unanimously:
1) Dismissed the application with costs; and
2) Declared Emmerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as duly elected President of Zimbabwe.
Significance
This case note is based on the abridged judgment of the Constitutional Court. Ideally the note
should have been based on the full reasoned judgment of the Court. However, at the time of
writing, more than a year since the handing down of the abridged judgment, the full reasoned
judgment had not yet been given.
The case is important as it is the first post-Mugabe presidential election petition. In a sense, the
case was a test of the Zimbabwean judiciary’s commitment to the possibility of contributing to
the democratic rebuilding and affirmation of constitutionalism in the immediate aftermath of
the dictatorial Mugabe era that destroyed key governance institutions, leaving them beholden
to the ruling elite. From the African continental perspective, it could also be said that the case
was an opportunity for the African judiciary to build on the precedent set by the Kenyan
Supreme Court in 2017 that nullified the presidential election and elaborated a jurisprudence
that is contextually relevant in redressing electoral fraud.
The decision by the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court, however, suggests that the Court failed
to grab the opportunity to contribute to more democratic jurisprudence that reflects
constitutional norms and values. In fact, the Court seemed to frown on the petitioner having
exercised his constitutional right to challenge the election. This can be gleaned from the first
order the court made. The Court tersely stated: ‘The application is dismissed with costs.’
Though short, this expression is weighty as it means the applicant had to bear the costs of all
the parties in the case (featuring 25 respondents). It is unheard of in Anglophone Africa for a
court to order costs in a constitutional matter of grave national interest. A perusal of presidential
election judgments from similar jurisdictions such as Zambia (1996, 1 2001, 2 2016 3), Uganda

1

Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika and Others v Fredrick Jacob Titus Chiluba (1998) ZR 49
Anderson Kambela Mazoka and Others v Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and Others (2005) ZR 138
3
Hakainde Hichilema and Another V Edgar Lungu and others 2016/CC/0031 Ruling No.33 of 2016
2
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(2001, 4 2006, 5 2016 6), Kenya (2013 7 and 2017 8), Ghana (2013 9) and Nigeria (2003 10 and
2007 11) demonstrates that costs are not usually ordered in such matters.
Challenging a presidential election is an exercise of a fundamental constitutional entitlement
that should not carry any risk of costs. The importance of this was forcefully stated by the
Supreme Court in Zambia:
As we have always said on costs in matters of this nature, it is in the interest of the
proper function of our democracy that challenges to the election of the president, which
are permitted by the Constitution and which are not frivolous should not be inhibited
by unwarranted condemnation in costs. 12
In this Zambian case, the Supreme Court dismissed the presidential election petition, but
considered that that alone did not mean there were no grievances upon which the applicant
could seek redress, despite the complaints not rising to the requisite level that would warrant
nullifying an election.
The South African Constitutional Court has elaborated a three-fold rationale for ordinarily not
ordering costs in constitutional matters. 13 First, it diminishes the chilling effect that an adverse
costs order can have on parties asserting constitutional rights and might have the effect of
citizens foregoing meritorious claims. Second, constitutional litigation, regardless of the
outcome, might bear not only on the interests of litigants directly involved in a matter, but may
have consequences on the rights of others similarly situated. Third, it is the state that bears
primary responsibility for ensuring that both the law and state conduct are consistent with the
constitution. 14
The fact that the Court did not find in favour of a litigant is not sufficient warrant to order costs.
The Court must take a broad look at matters raised and consider how a costs order may hinder
or promote the advancement of justice. 15 Writing for the unanimous Lesotho Court of Appeal,
Justice Musonda held that in constitutional matters, even if a litigant laboured under the
misconception that they had a good case, that alone is not sufficient ground for the court to
order costs when the case is lost.16
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Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Museveni Electoral Petition No. 1 of 2001
Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006
6
Amama Mbabazi v Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and Others Presidential Election Petition No. 01 of 2016
7
Raila Odinga vs. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and others Supreme Court Petition
No. 5,3 and 4 of 2013
8
Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others
Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2017
9
Nana Addo vs. John Dramani No J2/6/2013 Judgment of 29 August 2015
10
Muhammadu Buhari and others vs. Olusegun Obasanjo and others SC.133/2003 17 NWLR (2003)
11
Atiku Abubakar and others vs. Musa Umaru Yar’adua and others SC.72/2008 Supreme Court of Nigeria
Judgement of 12 December 2008
12
Anderson Kambela Mazoka and Others v Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and Others (2005) ZR 138
13
Trustees for the Time Being of the Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others [2009] ZACC
14, para 23
14
Ibid
15
Ibid, para 16
16
Kananelo Mosito and Others v Qhalehang Letsika and Others Court of Appeal (Civil) 9/2018, para 50. See
also The President of the Court of Appeal v The Prime Minister and Others Court of Appeal (Civil) 62/2013,
para 27
5
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Allowing aggrieved parties to seek relief in the courts without risking being condemned to
costs potentially opens the courts widely to the people, or as Prempeh put it, it allows judges
to ‘take the courts to the people.’ 17 This would ensure that courts become the commonly used
avenues for resolution of contested democratic claims as opposed to resort to street violence or
other self-help means.
In the case of Zimbabwe, the award of costs in constitutional matters is governed by the
Constitutional Court Rules 2016. 18 Rule 55(1) provides: ‘Generally no costs are awarded in a
constitutional matter: Provided that, in an appropriate case, the Court or judge, as the case may
be, may make such order of costs as it or he or she deems fit.’ The Court in this case never
even referred to this authority, nor did it give any explanation justifying the award of costs. In
the absence of a cogent justification for an award of costs, the Court could be said to have acted
arbitrarily and out of spite in order to ‘punish’ the petitioner for exercising his constitutional
right. Such a decision does not clothe the Zimbabwean Constitutional Court in good light and
suggests it failed to extricate itself from the feelings of the ruling party and its candidate whose
election was being challenged.
Another notable issue in the judgment relates to the nature of evidence the court suggested was
needed for the applicant to prove his claim. According to the Court, the petitioner should have
produced source evidence demonstrating the irregularities in the electoral results. This
evidence could, inter alia, have come from the candidate’s party poll agents and election
observers, by furnishing the Court with signed copies of election results forms (Form VII) from
polling stations. In the words of the Court:
The applicant was at large to have his polling station agents at each and every polling
station around the country. Observers were also free to participate in the process. The
applicant’s agents would have observed the voters arriving, being given the ballot
papers as applicants for these papers before the presiding officers, going to vote in
secret in the booths, and having the vote counted in their presence if they were there.
At the end of the counting all agents would have signed the VII form if they so wished
and given copies.
In the view of the Court, if the evidence from the agents and observers from polling stations
was produced, it would have answered all questions to do with allegations of manipulating the
results. The Court further thought that an election should not be easily nullified as the
declaration of results gave rise to a presumption of validity.
Although this approach looks innocuous on the surface, on close examination it gives the
impression of a Court that is scared to confront the electoral disputes presented before it headon, without excuses. As John Hatchard has argued, such an approach ‘can be seen as a way of
ensuring that the most sensitive of political questions is avoided.’ 19 Two short-comings of this
approach can be noted. First, in this computer technology era, results of an election can be
manipulated regardless of, or even more aptly, in spite of having party agents and observers at
the polling stations. This possibility is well illustrated by the 2017 Kenyan Supreme Court
decision. 20 In nullifying the election, the Supreme Court was convinced that the results were
17

H Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Marbury in Africa’s Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Africa’ (2006) 80 Tulane Law Review 65
18
Statutory Instrument 61 of 2016
19
John Hatchard, ‘Election Petitions and the Standard of Proof’ (2015) 27 Denning Law Journal 300
20
Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others
Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017
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tampered with in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission’s (IEBC) servers. The
IEBC itself was complicit in the fraud. In this case, reports from observers were of no use at
all, as the Supreme Court pointed out: ‘The interim reports [of observers] cannot therefore be
used to authenticate the transmission and eventual declaration of results.’ 21 Considering that
Chamisa made similar allegations of election results tampering as was the case with the 2017
Kenyan elections, the Court should have been more open to the possibility of elections being
manipulated not just at the polling station but in the national tabulation process, and to the
possibility that the ZEC may have been complicit.
Second, the presumption of validity of an election lacks any demonstrable basis in the
Zimbabwean Constitution, or any modern liberal constitutional law theory. The Court’s role as
a guardian of constitutionalism is to enforce constitutional values, in this case, the values of
allowing people to choose their own leaders in an environment that allows the collective and
genuine will of the people to prevail. As such, state institutions cannot be presumed, without
critically clearing every reasonable allegation, to administer a credible election. The
constitutional norms that entitle citizens to political participation and genuine elections also
bind public institutions and, therefore, state institutions should not enjoy any privileges and
presumptions in their favour. As the Kenyan Court in 2017 showed, such state institutions may
not always utilize their power for the common good but use it to manipulate systems for narrow
interests. It is, therefore, the duty of the electoral court to ensure that every little allegation is
properly assessed and to this effect, state institutions responsible for conducting elections
should not have any benefit of the assumption that they conducted their affairs prudently. This
approach was recently used by the Austrian Constitutional Court when it nullified that
country’s 2016 presidential election. It stated:
Therefore, not only individual possible incidents of manipulation, which are potentially
more likely, such as the invalidation of votes, but rather all theoretically possible forms
of manipulation and abuse have to be taken into account; because as explained above
the legal provisions intended to safeguard the electoral principles are also to serve as
protection against manipulation and abuse by the state itself as the organizer of the
elections. 22 (emphasis the author’s)
The role of the electoral court in a constitutional democracy should be to enforce constitutional
norms and not take pre-determined positions. It should be open to assess all possible allegations
and consider state agencies administering elections as equally bound to constitutional standards
as everyone else. The Zimbabwean Constitutional Court had an opportunity to do this. It had a
further opportunity to devise contextually relevant mechanisms of responding to local
democratic needs of the country and help rebuild the democratic aspirations of the Zimbabwean
people, taking the example of the Kenyan Supreme Court in 2017. This however, is not to argue
that the Court should have invalidated the election, but that it should have presided over the
dispute as a neutral enforcer of constitutional values. The abridged judgment, however,
suggests the opportunity may have been missed.

21

Ibid
Heinz-Christian Strache and Others v Federal Electoral Commission and Others Constitutional Court W
6/2016-125 (1 July 2016), page 159.
22
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Raila Odinga and Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others
Raila Odinga and Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and
Others [2013] KLR-SCK Petition No.5 of 2013 & No. 1 of 2017
Teddy J O Musiga
Facts
Since the establishment of the Supreme Court of Kenya in 2011, it has so far determined two
disputes arising from presidential election petitions. From the outset, it is important to clarify
that this commentary does not purport to review the decisions of the 2013 and 2017 presidential
election petitions. 1 It only seeks to review and critique one salient aspect that emerges from the
Supreme Court of Kenya’s approach in the treatment of rejected votes in those presidential
election disputes.
The case note criticises the Supreme Court of Kenya’s approach which seems to favour the
exclusion of rejected votes in the final computation of presidential election winners. It presents
an argument that rejected votes are important in the computation of presidential election
winners. It does that by raising three major arguments. The first argument flows from a rights
perspective; the right to vote. The second argument flows from the constitutional requirement
that presidential election winners ought to garner a fifty plus one percentage of the votes to win
an electoral contest. The third argument flows from the legal distinction between votes cast,
valid votes cast, spoilt ballots, stray votes and rejected votes. Ultimately, the paper concludes
by presenting a case for why rejected votes matter in a presidential election petition and why
they should be included in the computation of winners of presidential election contests.
Holding: The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Rejected Votes in Presidential Election
Petitions
In the wake of the 2013 Kenyan presidential elections, three private citizens filed a petition at
the Supreme Court of Kenya challenging the inclusion of rejected votes in the final tally of the
results of the presidential elections. 2 Prior to filing the Petition, it was alleged and reported in
the media that the Electoral Commission had made a decision to include the rejected votes in
the computation of the final presidential election results. 3
At the time of filing the Petition, it was alleged that there was an estimated total number of
330,000 rejected votes and the number kept rising. The petition was filed due to the fear that

1

For a full review of the 2013 and 2017 presidential election petitions see; Maina Wachira. ‘Verdict on Kenya’s
Presidential Election Petition: Five Reasons the Judgment Fails the Legal Test’ The East African,
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/Five-reasons-Kenya-SupremeCourt-failed-poll-petition-test//434750/1753646/-/297c6q/-/index.html> accessed 10 July 2019; George Kegoro ‘Why the Low-Key Conclusion
of a Very High Profile Election Dispute?’ <https://www.nation.co.ke/oped/opinion/440808-1753130bfjrptz/index.html> accessed 10 July 2019; Francis Angila Away (2016), “A critique of the Raila Odinga v IEBC
decision in light of the legal standards for Presidential elections in Kenya’ in Dr Collins Odote & Dr Linda
Musumba (eds) ‘Balancing the Scales of Electoral Justice Resolving Disputes from the 2013 General Elections in
Kenya and the Emerging Jurisprudence’ IDLO and JTI 2016; O’Brien Kaaba, ‘Raila Amolo Odinga and Another
v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017,’
(2018) 1SAIPAR Case Review
2
Petition No. 3 of 2013 eKLR; The Petitioners were Mr. Moses Kuria, Mr. Dennis Itumbi & Ms. Florence
Sergon. All of them were referred to as the second Petitioner in the consolidated petition.
3
Katrina Manson (2013, 6th March) 'Rejected' votes will be taken into account in Kenyan election. Accessed at
<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/rejected-votes-will-be-taken-into-account-in-kenyan-election1.1318136>
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their inclusion in the final tally could jeopardise an outright victory for either of the two leading
presidential candidates. 4
The Petitioners thus contended that the decision of the Electoral Commission to include the
rejected votes was in contravention of article 138(4) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 as well
as Rule 77(1) of the Elections (General) Regulations 2012. 5 The Supreme Court agreed with
their submissions and held that rejected votes should not count in the final tally of presidential
election votes. They also held that the correct interpretation of article 138(4) of the Constitution
refers only to valid votes cast and does not include ballot papers or votes that are cast but later
rejected for non-compliance with the terms of the governing law and regulations. 6
Following the 2017 Presidential elections, the question of the inclusion or exclusion of the
rejected votes in the final computation of the winner presidential election similarly became a
major issue in court. 7 However, this time around, that application was made within the context
of the main petition filed by the Petitioners as opposed to the 2013 case where the question
arose even before the declaration of the Presidential election winner by the Electoral
Commission.
Notably, the actual total number of rejected votes could not be clearly ascertained. On the one
hand, the Petitioners alleged that the total number of rejected votes accounted to about 2.6
percent of all the total votes cast. 8 On the other hand, the Respondents (Particularly the
Electoral Commission) alleged that the total number of rejected votes were 81,685 as declared
in Form 34C, a percentage of 0.54 percent of the total votes cast. Curiously, the Electoral
Commission in their submissions in court averred that the variance between the actual number
of rejected votes on Form 34C and the public portal (which the Petitioners used) were as a
result of human error and did not significantly affect the outcome of the election. 9 And
therefore following the precedent from the Supreme Court in 2013, they made a decision not
to include them in the final computation of the Presidential election winner.
Whichever the case, the Petitioners insisted and persistently argued that such numbers were
still too high to be ignored and that they had an effect on the final results and outcome of the
Presidential election. In that regard, the Petitioners urged the court to reconsider its 2013
findings on rejected votes and hold that rejected votes should be taken into account to determine
the threshold under article 138(4) of the Constitution. 10
In rendering their decision, the Supreme Court held that rejected votes should not be included
in the final computation of presidential election winners. Particularly, they held that:
a rejected vote is a vote which is void, a vote that accords no advantage to any candidate;
it cannot be used in the computation of determining the threshold of 50% + 1. A
purposive interpretation of article 138(4) of the Constitution, in terms of article 259 of

4

Consolidated petition (Petition No. 5 of 2013)[28]
Consolidated petition (Petition No. 5 of 2013)[28]
6
Consolidated petition (Petition No. 5 of 2013)[28]
7
Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 6 others [2017] KLR-SCK
Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2017
8
Petition No. 1 of 2017[40-43]; Dissenting judgment by Njoki Ndung’u, SCJ[176]
9
Petition No. 1 of 2017[78-80]
10
Ibid[154-170]
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the Constitution, leads to only one logical conclusion: that the phrase votes cast in
article 138(4) means valid votes. 11
Consequently, the Supreme Court upheld the view they had earlier adopted in the 2013 case.
Effectively, both the 2013 and 2017 decision of the Supreme Court held that ‘rejected votes’
do not matter and should not be included when determining computations for presidential
election winners.
To better comprehend how the Supreme Court treated the question of either inclusion or
exclusion of rejected votes in the two cases, it is important to give a brief background to what
those two cases were about.
(a)

2013 Raila Amolo Odinga Presidential Election Petition (Consolidated Petition
No. 5 of 2013)
Following the disputed elections of March 4th, 2013, three separate Presidential election
petitions were filed at the Supreme Court of Kenya to challenge that election outcome. The
first petition contested the inclusion of rejected votes in the final tally which, they argued had
a distorting effect on the percentage votes won by each candidate. 12 The second petition
contested the manner in which the electoral process was conducted by the electoral
management body. 13 The third petition challenged the legality of the electoral management
body’s declaration of Uhuru Kenyatta as president elect. 14
They were all later consolidated into one petition; Odinga & 5 others v Independent Electoral
and Boundaries Commission & 3 others. 15 The main issue to be decided by the Court in the
consolidated Petition was the allegation that the entire election was not conducted in
accordance with the Constitution and the electoral laws. Consequently, it was argued that the
presidential electoral process was so fundamentally flawed that it was impossible to ascertain
whether the presidential results as declared were lawful.
However, after the hearings, the Court unanimously upheld the election of the 3rd and 4th
Respondents as President and Deputy President – elect respectively.
Table 1: 2013 Summary of Presidential Election Results
Actual figures
Percentages
12,330,028
100.00%
Total votes cast
12,221,053
99.12%
Valid votes cast
108,975
0.88%
Rejected votes
(b)
2017 Raila Amolo Odinga Presidential Election Petition
In 2017, another presidential election petition was filed at the Supreme Court of Kenya
following the disputed presidential elections held on August 8, 2017. 16 Incidentally, the main
11

Petition No. 1 of 2017 [170]
Petition No. 3 of 2013 eKLR; It was filed by 3 petitioners. All of them were referred to as the second
Petitioner in the consolidated petition.
13
Petition No. 4 of 2013 Eklr; Both Petitioners were identified as the third Petitioner in the consolidated
Petition.
14
Odinga & 5 others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 3 others [2013] KLR-SCK
Petitions No 5 of 2013
15
Ibid
16
Odinga & another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 6 others [2017] KLR-SCK
Presidential Election Petition No. 1 of 2017
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petitioner was the same person who was the main petitioner in the 2013 presidential election
petition. 17 The petitioners raised many issues inter alia that the conduct of the 2017 presidential
election violated the principles of a free and fair election as well as the electoral process as set
out in the Constitution, electoral laws and regulations and that the respondents committed
errors in voting, counting and tabulation of results. The petitioners alleged further that the
respondents had committed irregularities and improprieties that significantly affected the
election results. One of the major issues with regards to the counting and tabulation of the
presidential election results revolved around the question of either inclusion or exclusion of the
rejected votes (which is the main subject of discussion in this paper).
Table 2: 2017 Summary of August 2017 Presidential Election Results
Actual figures
Percentages
15,593,050
100.00%
Total votes cast
15,180,381
97.35%
Valid votes cast
411,510
2.63%
Rejected votes
After the hearing of the petition, the court rendered a decision annulling the results of the 8th
August, 2017 Presidential elections. In summary, when annulling the results of that presidential
election by a majority of four to two, the Supreme Court judges held that there were systemic
and systematic irregularities and illegalities that prevented the election from standing. As a
result of the foregoing, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)
conducted a fresh election on October 26, 2017 whereupon the ruling party’s candidate Uhuru
Kenyatta was declared the President.
Significance
The position of the Supreme Court of Kenya with regards to treatment of rejected votes is one
that excludes the rejected votes in computing the overall election outcome. In their view, ‘a
rejected vote is a vote which is void, a vote that accords no advantage to any candidate; it
cannot be used in the computation of determining the threshold of 50% + 1’. 18
As a result of both decisions, it has become increasingly doubtful how to treat rejected votes in
Kenya. This paper argues that both decisions took a narrow approach by holding that rejected
votes only refer to the ‘valid votes cast’. In the Supreme Court’s view, for a vote to be
considered during the computations for determining winners, then it needs to offer a numerical
advantage to at least one of the candidates in the electoral contest. Therefore, in their view, the
only votes to be counted are the valid votes cast; rejected votes or even stray votes should not
be counted at all.
The problem with holding that ‘votes cast’ only refers to ‘valid votes cast’ springs from the
fact that article 138(4) of the Constitution of Kenya expressly provides for ‘votes cast’ and not
‘valid votes cast’. This presupposes that all the votes found inside the ballot box should be
counted and tabulated as ‘total votes cast’. In that way, the returns of the election are able to
clearly indicate the total percentages of each contestant after the inclusion of all the rejected
votes. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court seems to prefer an approach where ‘total votes cast’
are equated to ‘valid votes cast’. This is problematic because throughout Kenya’s electoral
17

The only major difference was that whereas in the 2013 Presidential election, Mr. Odinga ran for the elections
under a coalition called, ‘Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD)’; in the 2017 presidential elections he
ran under a coalition called, ‘National Super Alliance’. Both coalitions were composed of multiple political parties
registered in Kenya.
18
Petition No. 1 of 2017[170; see also Consolidated Petition No. 5 of 2013[258-285]
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laws, the only mention of the term ‘valid votes cast’ is found in regulations 69(2) and 70 of the
Elections (General) Regulations, 2012 which is subsidiary legislation. And interpretation
‘votes cast’ to be ‘valid votes cast’ creates the absurdity that a constitutional principle is being
interpreted using a subsidiary legislation.
It therefore remains unclear why the Supreme Court has twice chosen to interpret the meaning
of ‘votes cast’ by making reference to the meaning given to it in subsidiary legislation as
opposed to giving it the meaning provided for in the Constitution of Kenya. Notably, article
138(4) of the Constitution of Kenya provides for ‘votes cast’; which is a departure is from
section 5 (3) (f) of the repealed Constitution of Kenya which provided that in computation of
presidential election winners, only ‘valid votes’ matter.
A plain reading of regulations 69(2) and 70 leads to the conclusion that they only refer to valid
votes. The Supreme Court in both petitions held that a voter is said to have cast his or her vote
when the procedure under regulations 69(2) and 70 of the Elections (General) Regulations,
2012 has been followed. 19 That means that, that upon receipt of the ballot paper, the voter
proceeds to mark correctly, indicating his exact choice of the candidate he wishes to vote for,
and then inserts that marked ballot paper into the respective ballot box for the election
concerned.
Both the 2013 and 2017 decisions further raise several assumptions; first, that the right to vote
only refers to valid votes cast to the exclusion of rejected votes, stray votes and disputed votes
and second, that the rejected votes have no numerical value to the ultimate computation of all
the votes cast in any given election.
Yet, world over it is increasingly becoming accepted that rejected votes play a key role in
electoral outcomes and should never be ignored. For instance, Canadian jurisprudence indicates
that for an election to be annulled; the total number of rejected votes should be equal to or outnumber the winner’s plurality (Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj) 20. That shows that the numerical value
of rejected votes cannot be ignored.
While countries like the United States of America treat rejected votes as, ‘residual votes,’21
usually, residual votes are either ‘over-votes or under-votes’. Under-votes refer to a ballot in
which a counting machine found no voter choice for a particular office. 22 In such a case, the
voter refrains from voting for any candidate. On the other hand, an over-vote is a ballot that is
rejected by the counting machine because it indicates more than one choice for an office. 23 In
the 2004 presidential petition of Bush v Gore 24, the American Supreme Court held that
sufficient ‘legal votes’ existed among the under-votes cast thus making the outcome of the
election doubtful. The court therefore ordered a recount of all the remaining under-votes in
Florida State.
19

Petition 1 of 2017[166-167]
Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, 2012 SCC 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76
21
Michael J. Hammer, Won-Ho Park, Michael W. Traugott, Richard G. Niemi, Paul S. Herrnson, Benjamin B.
Bederson and Frederick C. Conrad, ‘Losing Fewer Votes: The Impact of Changing Voting Systems on Residual
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Consequently, comparative jurisprudence on the question of rejected votes indicates that its
proper comprehension should come from a solid understanding of electoral behaviour of voters
which has a bearing on the overall election outcomes. To further support the importance of
rejected votes, Maina Wachira argues in his paper, ‘Verdict on Kenya’s presidential election
petition: Five reasons the judgment fails the legal test’ 25, that rejected votes should count for
two reasons. First, from a rights perspective, the right to vote entails three elements: the right
to make a choice from among the candidates on the ballot; the right to refuse to participate in
the election by abstaining and the right to cast a protest vote by rejecting all the candidates on
the ballot. He argues that the right to cast a protest vote can be expressed by deliberately
spoiling a ballot. Second, he argues that rejected votes should count because the article 138(4)
of the Kenyan Constitutions sets high electoral thresholds for the presidential elections. That
provision requires that for a person to be declared the winner of a presidential election, they
should garner more than half of all the votes cast in the elections as well as at least twenty five
percent of the votes cast in more than half of each county. Notably, such a prerequisite does
not exist for all other electoral positions.
Therefore, from an electoral theory perspective, the right to vote also contemplates protest
votes and thus such votes should not be treated as an error as the Supreme Court has twice
done. However, and admittedly, some rejected ballots could arise out of illiteracy levels of
voters thereby meriting the argument that they be treated as an error rather than a protest. In
such a case, the illiterate voters do not understand how to make their decision from among the
candidates presented in the ballot paper. The electoral laws provide that a valid ballot is that
which has been marked correctly. The decision of how to mark the ballot paper is often left to
the discretion of the individual voter. In giving meaning to the ‘mark’ made by a voter in the
ballot paper, the electoral officers often look at the intention of the voter.
However, a sample of ballot papers that were eventually treated as rejected votes revealed that
due to high levels of illiteracy, certain voters fail to mark their ballot papers correctly. They
(voters) do so by either not making any mark on the ballot, viz, leaving the ballot paper blank
or writing on the ballot paper in a way that cannot be treated as a ‘mark’ in strictu sensu.
Additionally, some voters put marks against the names of all the candidates in the ballot paper
while others put their signatures alongside ‘the mark’. Others also draw on the ballot paper. In
all these scenarios (and many others not mentioned), the electoral officers often treat such
ballots as rejected votes.
Moving away from the argument that rejected votes come about as a result of illiteracy,
disregarding rejected votes leads to two further conceptual challenges. First, it puts the voter
who goes to a polling station, queues and makes a decision to cast a protest vote against all the
candidates on the ballot in the same position as that citizen who in spite of having the right to
vote chooses to stay at home and not vote. 26
The second challenge is also best captured by Maina Wachira’s analogy in which he describes
an electoral contest with 100 voters and two hugely unpopular candidates. 27 . The winner of
the election outcome is expected to garner 50 plus one of all the votes cast. 60 percent of the
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voters protest against both by ‘spoiling’ their ballots. Candidate A, gets 35 votes and candidate
B, gets five votes. If rejected votes are included, candidate A has only 35 percent of the votes
cast and cannot win in the first round because he/she falls short of the 50 plus one requirement.
But if you exclude rejected votes, candidate A wins with 87.5 percent of valid votes cast, and,
therefore, meets the required threshold of 50 plus one.
Another reason why rejected votes should be counted stems from the legal distinction between
spoilt ballots and rejected ballots. Under Rule 71 of the Elections (General) Regulations 2012,
a spoilt ballot paper is generally one that a voter has inadvertently spoiled and handed back to
the election officers in exchange for a new blank ballot. The voter is then issued a fresh ballot
paper in place of the former. Such a ballot paper does not enter the voting box (it is not cast)
and therefore cannot be counted among the votes cast.
On the other hand under Rule 77(1), a rejected ballot refers to that ballot which either (i) lacks
certain security features, (ii) the voter has voted for more than one candidate, (iii) the voter has
left on it a writing or mark by which he/she may be identified or (iv) the ballot remains
unmarked or void for uncertainty. Regardless of the reason, a rejected ballot, therefore, is a cast
vote; the result of a voter attending a polling station and placing a ballot in the ballot box. Such
a ballot should be counted towards turnout, even if it doesn’t count towards a particular
candidate. It is merely counted for purposes of determining who among the electoral
contestants meets the 50 plus one threshold. The rationale is that, the law and electoral practise
contemplate a tabulation of each and every vote cast at the point of filing returns when the
voting exercise ends. This is why, particularly Forms 34A, B & C (used by the electoral
management body for filing returns for presidential election winners) each have a slot for
tabulating the total numbers of valid votes cast, rejected votes, votes, disputed votes, stray votes
and spoilt ballots. Further, rule 81 of the Elections (General) Regulations 2012 also provides
that, ‘upon completion of a count, including a recount, the presiding officer shall seal in each
respective ballot box – (a) valid votes; (b) rejected ballots sealed in a tamperproof envelop; (c)
used ballot papers sealed in a tamper proof envelop; (d) counterfoils of used ballot papers
sealed in a tamperproof envelop; (e) copy of election results declaration forms; and (f) stray
ballot papers in tamperproof envelops.’
In conclusion, the main argument in this paper has been that a proper interpretation and
understanding of the term ‘votes cast’ should refer to all the votes cast, viz, all the ballot papers
that have been marked and thereafter inserted in the ballot box. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court of Kenya has twice held that the term ‘votes cast’ only refers to valid votes cast. The
question then becomes; why tabulate all votes if at the end of the exercise they count for
nothing?
Finally, this paper has shown that rejected votes matter and also that they should be included
in the final computation when determining presidential election winners. The paper also
demonstrated why there is a need to rethink the twin decisions (of 2013 and 2017) of the
Supreme Court on the question of the treatment of rejected votes.

15

Elias C. Chipimo
Daniel Pule and Others v Attorney General and Others 2017/CCZ/004 Selected
Judgment No. 60 of 2018
Elias C. Chipimo
Facts
In a case brought to determine the eligibility of President Edgar Lungu to stand as a presidential
candidate in 2021, having served less than three years in his first term, the Constitutional Court
determined that: ‘…the presidential tenure of office that ran from January 25, 2015 to
September 13, 2016 and straddled two constitutional regimes, cannot be considered as a full
term.’
In doing so, the Constitutional Court effectively backdated the application of the ‘New Clauses’
to a time when there was already a law governing: (a) the eligibility of a person to stand again
as a presidential candidate who has twice been elected as president (he or she would be
disqualified); and (b) how long a presidential term needed to be in order to count as a full term
under the law (there was previously no minimum period, meaning prior to the 2016 amendment
to the Constitution, a person could technically be president for less than a year and still be
deemed to have served a full term).
To give you an example of the awkwardness of this position, imagine the Constitution being
amended to raise the qualification age for presidency to 40 years from 35. Using the logic
above, a president who was elected at 35 years would now be deemed to be ineligible to have
stood in the earlier election based on a law that had not existed at the time.
The pre-amended Constitution clearly stated that ‘a person who has twice been elected as
President’ could not run again for that office, while the amended Constitution states that a
person who has ‘twice held office’ cannot run again for that office. There is no contradiction
in these two positions – the later version simply tidies up the earlier one by making clear that
there also has to be a swearing in.
Under Zambia’s Republican Constitution, the rule about a presidential term not qualifying as
a full term if it spanned a period of less than 3 years, first came into existence in the 2016
amended Constitution. It arises in only two situations: (a) where the office of president falls
vacant and the vice-president automatically takes over (e.g. if the incumbent dies); and (b)
when an election is held because the vice-president who should take over to serve the remaining
term is either unwilling or unable to do so. We can call these the ‘New Clauses’.
Obviously neither of these situations was at play during the 2015 presidential election because
these provisions were not in existence and were therefore not recognised in the law at that time.
Holding
The Court’s justification for their decision is that they felt Parliament would have intended to
make transitional provisions to address the question of the term of the president under the preamendment Constitution but simply overlooked it. As stated by the Court:
…the question is what could have been the intention of the legislature on this aspect of
the transitional arrangements for the presidential term straddling two constitutional
regimes? Our firm view is that it could not have been the intention of the legislature not
to provide for the period that was served and that straddled two Constitutional regimes,
as to how it should be treated.
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In short, the Court decided that they should backdate the application of the three-year rule, even
though it did not exist at the time of President Lungu’s first election, because of the need to
clarify how this would affect a person that happened to be president in between these two
constitutional regimes.
Significance
I believe the Constitutional Court misdirected itself and I set out seven grounds to justify this
conclusion:
1. The idea that the first period served by the incumbent president straddled two Constitutional
regimes and therefore needed some form of transitional wording is really a fabrication of a
concept. The Court somehow managed to identify a problem that did not exist – the amended
constitution was assented to seven months before the 2016 election. Parliament was dissolved
in May, 2016 and the remaining time to the election was merely a caretaker phase as the official
campaign period had already commenced and was nearing its conclusion. The president’s
tenure was therefore coming to an end under the 2015 mandate which was adequately covered
by the pre-amended Constitution. As we shall see later, serving even for one year constituted a
full term under the pre-amended Constitution.
2. In inserting and backdating the application of a provision that was only due to come into
effect after the Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed, the Constitutional Court has, in
effect, usurped the power of Parliament, abrogating the fundamental rule of separation of
powers. They concluded that ‘…it could not have been the intention of the legislature not to
provide for the period that was served and that straddled two Constitutional regimes, as to how
it should be treated,’ and then went on to decide on behalf of Parliament, which option they
believe Parliament would have chosen. Raising the concern about intention is one thing;
deciding which option Parliament would have taken is quite another. The Court has therefore
planted into an earlier time, a provision in the law that Parliament did not on the face of it
intend to come into effect until 2016 and they have done it using a set of facts that does not fit
with the situation contemplated by the very provision they are relying on. For there to be
justification that Parliament’s intention should be assumed by the Courts, there would have to
be compelling reasons that doing nothing would result in injustice or unreasonableness. This
was not the case – there would be no crisis if President Lungu was subjected to the same rule
as his predecessors, namely that anything less than three years still constitutes a full term.
3. In 2015, the president was elected under the pre-amendment Constitution and was therefore
subject to its provisions as they existed at the time. When the amendments were made – not
too long before the campaign period had been officially opened – the logical assumption is that
they would apply to future elections since they referred to a system that was planned to be
introduced by the very amendments (i.e. the system of the running mate).
4. Interpreting the intention of Parliament in this way goes against the principle in law that
unless expressly stated, law has no retrospective effect. As a general rule, law is not to be
applied to the retrospectively unless it clearly stipulates as such. Even then, it cannot be applied
to undermine rights that were available to someone before the new law existed.
5. No transitional provision was necessary in this case if the intention (as is clearly stated in
the amended Constitution) was to tie the three-year rule to vice-presidents taking over from an
incumbent (or any other person doing the same because the vice-president could not or chose
not to stand). By deciding that some form of transitional provision was necessary, the Court
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was effectively making a decision to protect one man, President Lungu, because only he was
affected by the decision of Parliament not to include any transitional provisions. This was not
a new Constitution that was being presented; it was merely the same document being amended
and unless the intention was clearly stated by the Legislature, there was no basis for the Court
to impose an intention on Parliament.
6. Under the pre-amended Constitution, there was no such thing as a partial term. If the
incumbent died two years before the next election then a fresh election would have to be held
and this remaining two years would be counted as a full term. The clear intention of the
legislature under the pre-amended Constitution was not to have partial terms. By introducing
this new issue of a partial terms of less than three years not counting as a full term, it ought to
have been clear that this was only to apply under the new dispensation – i.e. after the amended
Constitution came into force and not before. Parliament would not have needed to put
transitional arrangements in place to deal with such a straightforward matter. All future
elections would be subject to the new provisions and all prior elections would be subject to the
old provisions.
7. The facts that would need to be present to support the retrospective application of the
minimum three-year term rule are absent: in 2015, there was no automatic process for any vicepresident to take over and the election was held, not because there was a vacancy or because
of any incapacity of the vice-president. The election in September 2015 was held because the
Constitution at the time required an election to be held within 90 days whenever there was a
vacancy in the office of the president.
The indisputable fact is that the person whose term of office started on 25 January 2015 did not
ascend to the office of President because he was vice-president or as a result of an election held
because the then vice-president could not, for any reason, assume the office of President. There
was no need for the Constitutional Court to assume that Parliament overlooked the need for
transitional provisions regarding the issue of term of office. In doing so, the Court has probably
overstepped its jurisdiction and granted rights to an incumbent president that were not given to
him by Parliament. Although in their judgment they try to distance themselves from making
this an issue about President Lungu, their decision makes it precisely that because he is the
only one that will acquire a new right as a result of their assumption of what they believe
Parliament would have done if they had applied their minds to it. This is a matter that can be
taken up in the High Court as it is not premised on the interpretation of the Constitution but is
a jurisprudential issue concerning the separation of powers and the powers the Constitutional
Court has given itself to address a problem that never existed in the first place.
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Kilolo Ng’ambi v Opa Kapijimpanga Appeal No. 210/2015 (Judgment of 9th October
2018)
O’Brien Kaaba
Facts
This was an appeal against the High Court decision relating to succession disputes for the
Kapijimpanga chieftaincy in North Western Zambia. The incumbent chief died on the throne
in 2008. Duly following the traditional succession process, the traditional electoral college
(composed of certain members of the royal family) gathered in September 2010 to choose the
next chief. Six contenders emerged and were all considered eligible. The electoral college could
not agree on which one of them should be chief and the process ended in a deadlock. In
consequence, the electoral college executed a written agreement among themselves to enlist a
third party, Chief Mujimanzovu, to break the deadlock by choosing one of the six to be the
chief. Mujimanzovu, as requested, chose the Appellant, Kilolo Ng’ambi, as the new chief. No
reasons are given for the selection, or at least the judgment does not mention any.
Dissatisfied with the decision of Chief Mujimanzovu, the respondent and others asked the High
Court to nullify the selection of the appellant, arguing in part that the method of his selection
was not in line with the established succession customary law of the Kaonde people. The High
Court nullified the selection of the appellant. Considering that this was a novel situation which
had not arisen before and for which there were no traditional mechanisms for resolving it, the
High Court creatively made the following orders:
1. Stakeholders in the chieftaincy such as indunas and other group leaders, as interested
parties and subjects of the chiefdom without whom there would be no chief, be fairly
represented in coming up with a formula, criteria or solution which will assist in
resolving any stalemate in the selection process for the Kapijimpanga throne;
2. All eligible candidates be accorded an opportunity to offer themselves as possible
successors;
3. The candidates be assessed on presentation of their family trees supported by the
official registers of the matrilineal lineage and any other recognized books of historical
literature;
4. The whole process be conducted within 90 days of the date of this judgment; and
5. In default of taking all the required necessary steps, any of the parties is hereby granted
liberty to apply.
Holding
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court. It took the capricious and narrow
view that since the electoral college, which was entitled under Kaonde customary law to select
a chief, asked Chief Mujimanzovu to break the deadlock, the electoral college had ‘delegated’
its powers to him. The decision of Chief Mujimanzovu appointing the appellant, therefore,
stood as he was a delegate of the electoral college. The Supreme Court held that the appellant
was, therefore, correctly chosen as the rightful heir to the throne of the Kapijimpanga
chieftaincy.
Significance
The case raises important questions about how customary law disputes should be resolved by
the courts where existing customary law does not have appropriate mechanisms in place to
redress the problem. What should be done if a novel problem arises in the context of customary
law and the existing customary law is inadequate to address it? The judgment of the Supreme
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Court fails to thoroughly answer that question. Reading the judgment leaves one with a sense
that the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to develop clear, well-reasoned and principled
jurisprudence that would be a useful guide to similar challenges in future. The decision is
unconvincing, amorphous and lacking in rigorous legal analysis.
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court overwhelmingly relied on the view that the
electoral college ‘delegated’ that responsibility to a third party to help break the deadlock. In
holding so, the Supreme Court cited no authority at all, apart from referring to a dictionary to
define delegation as follows:
In common parlance, delegated authority is the entrusting some of one’s work/function
to others. According to the Law Dictionary, delegated authority means the transfer of
authority from one person to another. It implies acting on behalf of another for another’s
benefit. It is apparent, in this case, that the royal families of the Kapijimpanga chiefdom
delegated their function to choose a chief to Senior Chief Mujimanjovu after they had
reached a deadlock.
There is nowhere else the Supreme Court deals further with this concept in any nuanced
manner. It is common knowledge in law that the concept of delegation is not as simplistic as
stated by the Supreme Court. At common law the general principle is that power should be
exercised by those upon whom it is conferred. 1 A function can only be delegated if the source
of power allows for such delegation. Otherwise a delegate cannot delegate: delegatus non
potest delegare. 2
There is nowhere in the judgment that the Supreme Court indicates that the electoral college
had power to delegate its function to a third party. Considering that the situation was novel and
no similar precedent existed in the customary law of the concerned community, there was,
therefore, no basis for assuming that electoral college functions were delegable. The electoral
college were mere representatives of the members of the concerned customary law tradition.
They exercised power to select the chief on behalf of their people, as delegates of the larger
community. When the exercise of that delegated power ended in a deadlock, the delegates did
not have the power to do as they wished. It was, therefore, necessary for the court to trace the
source of that power and be satisfied that it could be delegated lawfully. This never happened.
There was, therefore, no basis in the judgment for assuming that the electoral college lawfully
delegated its power. Surely in law delegation is not a blank cheque.
That has been the consistent thread running through the jurisprudence relating to the concept
of delegation. For example, in the case of Reverend Lameck Joshua Kausa v The Registrar of
Societies (1977) ZR 195 it was held that power conferred specifically on the Registrar of
Societies could not be delegated to his subordinate. By parity of reason, power conferred by
the community on the electoral college could, therefore, not be delegated to a third party, as
there was no existing customary law that allowed for such delegation.
It is suggested that to resolve the dispute, the Supreme Court could have adopted a more
creative approach that recognizes customary law as ‘living,’ evolving and adaptive and see
themselves (the Court) as having a role in developing customary law that is democratized and
consistent with constitutional values. This is the approach, for example, the South African
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Constitutional Court seems to have taken. 3 Although the Supreme Court tersely recognized the
adaptive capabilities of customary law, it disavowed any role for the Court in the development
of that customary law, stating that ‘whether or such solution [appointing a third party to break
the deadlock where the electoral college was unable to decide] would be “one off” solution or
evolve into a new custom or tradition to address similar situations is for the electoral college
to decide.’ By so holding, the Supreme Court envisioned no role for itself in the development
of customary law and left its development entirely in the fate of social accidents and
vicissitudes of history.
This approach taken by the Supreme Court is problematic as it does not allow for customary
law to develop in a consistent and principled manner that would be in line with constitutional
norms. As former South African Chief Justice, Pius Langa, stated, such an ad hoc approach to
the development of customary law is unsatisfactory as ‘changes will be very slow; uncertainties
regarding the real rules of customary law will be prolonged and there may be different solutions
to similar problems.’ 4 Article 7(d) of the Zambian Constitution recognizes customary law as
a source of legal norms, subject only to the Constitution. The judiciary, as guardian of the
Constitution, has a clear mandate to ensure customary law develops in a manner consistent
with constitutional norms and values. The Supreme Court should not have abdicated this
mandate.
While it is the responsibility of the court to determine what customary law is or ought to be in
line with the constitutional norms, this does not entail the Court imposing its views about
particular customary norms. It is the role of the concerned customary community to collectively
develop and shape their own customs in responding to new social and economic developments
in society. A new practice cannot be considered a binding customary norm by members of the
concerned community without internalizing it and considering themselves bound by it. This is
akin to Professor HLA Hart’s concept of a ‘reflective critical attitude.’ 5 That is, the members
of the concerned community regard a custom as a common standard of behaviour upon which
criticism and demands for conformity would be considered justified. 6
To have this critical reflective attitude, it is essential ‘to respect the right of communities that
observe systems of customary law to develop their law.’ 7 This way, the concerned community
is, therefore, ‘empowered to bring its customs into line with the norms and values of the
constitution.’ 8 The importance of this was succinctly stated by the South African Constitutional
Court:
…it is important to ensure that customary law’s congruence with our constitutional
ethos is developed in a participatory manner, reflected by the voices of those who live
the custom. This is essential to dispel the notion that constitutional values are foreign
to customary law and are being imposed on people living under customary law against
their will. 9
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This suggests that the development of a new customary norm is the concern of the wide
community who live that custom and should not be left in the hands of a small group, as the
Supreme Court effectively decided. The decision of the High Court, which required wider
community participation and consensus building in resolving the problem seems consistent
with this approach than the position taken by the Supreme Court. The approach taken by the
High Court could have ensured democratization of customary law by ensuring that as far as
possible, new customary norms would be developed in a more consultative and participatory
manner. Such an approach would serve the purpose of fostering constitutional values such as
democracy, constitutionalism and good governance as elaborated under Article 8(c) and (e) of
the Constitution. That said, it goes without saying that the Supreme Court missed a tremendous
opportunity to set clear standards in the evolution of customary law so that its development
would be participatory, principled and consistent
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